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I
The European Convention on Human Rights reflects collective 
understanding of universal legal and moral norms applicable to all 
people of Europe. By becoming a contracting party to the Convention 
the respective countries, to use the wording of Article 1, undertake the 
obligation to secure everyone within their jurisdiction the rights provided 
for in the substantive provisions. In this respect the European Convention 
on Human Rights does not differ much from other international human 
rights treatises. However, it has specific features which distinguish it from 
other international human rights treatises, namely the establishment of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), individual petition and 
the binding nature of the judgments under Article 46 of the Convention, 
whereby the contracting states undertake to abide by the final judgment 
of the Court in any case which they are parties. These specific features 
call for co­operation and mutual understanding between the national 
Courts (including Constitutional Courts) and the ECtHR, but at the same 
time it is also a source of disagreement, even confrontation.
II
In the history of the Court there are many examples where judgments 
of the ECtHR have been a received with great reservations in the 
respective countries. Almost all the contracting States have experience 
this in one form or another. One recent example is the reaction in Germany 
to the judgment in the Hannover case where the Court «overruled» the 
Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundeverfassungsgericht) as regards 
the latter’s balancing of Article 8 and Article 10 rights [1]. Another 
example is the Görgülü – case [2]. The rulings of the ECtHR in these 
cases were not well received in German legal circles to say the least. Even 
former judges at the highest Courts protested [3]. The third example is 




It is understandable that the decisions of the Strasbourg Court 
at times meet resistance and criticism. The highest Courts in all the 
Contracting States have had their conclusions as regards protection of 
human rights «rejected» by the ECtHR, and sometimes in cases of great 
legal and political importance in the respective country. This has at times 
given rise to negative sentiments towards the Strasbourg Court. National 
judges, law professors, politicians and others accuse the court of having 
misunderstood national law, failing to understand the national situation 
properly and not being aware of the historical, social and political context 
in which the case is rooted, and so on and so forth. Some would question 
the ability of the judges to fully understand the situation in a far away 
country. Thus, for example, I am sure that some would claim that a judge 
from Iceland, an island far away up in stormy North Atlantic, will have 
difficulties in fully understanding in detail the historical, economical 
and legal situation in country like Ukraine. This is of course true, just 
as a judge from Ukraine will have difficulties with understanding the 
situation in Iceland. But not with standing all our differences we have 
agreed among ourselves to abide by the Convention in an attempt to 
find a common standard for the protection of fundamental human 
rights applicable in Reykjavik as well as Odessa, and all the places 
there between. It is the role of the Court to identify and to consolidate a 
universal common standard for all the Contracting Parties. This will of 
course never be done to everyone’s liking.
IV
But the misgivings by which the judgments of the Strasbourg are 
sometimes received will not be fully explained by the factors mentioned 
above. They also have their roots in different constitutional and political 
traditions and approaches, especially when it comes to the appreciation 
and acceptance of the Convention and the case law of the Court in 
the national system. On the one hand we have pro-international (pro­
globalisation) way of thinking, and on the other hand we have an emphasis 
on self-determination and sovereignty of states. Those approaching the 
issue from the point of view of international institutions like the Court 
tend to adhere to the former approach. Those who approach it from the 
point of view of the domestic law and the domestic court are inclined to 
emphasis the latter [5].
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The pro-internationalists (pro-globalists) advocate a constitutional 
system and political theory aiming at advancing an ethical position 
where supremacy of international human rights law is at the centre. 
International law is seen as best serving certain moral principles and 
justice, aiming, first and foremost, at respect for human rights and 
welfare of individuals. As such these theories postulate the existence of 
general legal principles based on moral principles and ideas of natural 
law and natural rights of individuals to a protection of their fundamental 
human rights [6]. 
It is argued that on these points it is important that individuals 
not only have rights based on international rules, but also that states 
have duty to fulfil them. It is submitted that only binding rules of 
international law will achieve this aim and that too much emphasis on 
a international system based on independent sovereign states where 
each state sets it own standards stands in the way of reaching universal 
standard for all people.
A common element in pro­internationalist approach is also 
a certain dislike for the state as an abstraction and an «aversion for 
state omnipotence». An aversion developed during the twentieth 
Century to contest the idea that within the framework of sovereignty, 
states could do what they wanted vis-à-vis individuals within their 
jurisdiction, without any repercussions on behalf of other states based 
on international law [7]. 
Sovereignty or state omnipotence has in this way been blamed for 
the horrors of wars and large scale human rights violations in course of 
the century, in particular during times of war. This has allegedly led to 
a certain distrust of the state as a vehicle for upholding and respecting 
fundamental principles of law, most importantly fundamental human 
rights, and given support to theories which ideologically sever the law 
from the state by referring to some higher law that states must follow 
vis-à-vis individuals. Due to the link between emphasis on sovereignty 
in the lawmaking process and the dualist approach to international law 
these anti­sovereignty doctrines were inclined at the same to be anti-
dualist and to replace dualism by the so called monist approach, by 
emphasising the homogeneity of international law and national law. 
Those who work in an international environment are inclined to look at 
things from this point of view. 
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V
On the other side we have the national judges who are prone to 
advocate idea of self-determination and sovereignty of states, together 
with the rule of law within the boundary of the state, ideas of separation 
of powers, in particular the separation between legislative and executive 
powers, as well as ideas of democratic process and development [8]. 
It is argued that national law should not be automatically subject 
to changes in events on the international level over which the national 
legislature has no control, for example in light of a case law from an 
international court like the ECtHR. By viewing national law and 
international law as distinct legal orders, one protects sovereignty and 
national self­determination, as well as the internal democratic political 
processes, against direct legislation by a treaty or direct application of 
the courts thereof. 
Another constitutional element here, which is often associated with 
dualism, is the separation of powers between the different branches of 
government, where the head of state, holding highest executive power is 
responsible for negotiating and finalising (ratifying) international treaties 
and the legislator makes new law. Since in many of dualist countries, i.a. 
the Nordic countries, ratification of treaties is a matter for the executive 
(with some exceptions) it must be assumed that a further involvement 
of the legislature is needed before an international norm contained in a 
treaty becomes a part of the internal order. 
Further consideration in favour of this approach derives from the 
idea of rule of law and legal certainty where the minimum demand is 
that it should be possible to say with reasonable certainty whether or not 
a specified norm forms a part of the municipal system. This argument 
is specifically directed at certain pro international approaches who 
allegedly offer unclear criteria as to whether a given norm automatically 
becomes a part of the national legal order or not. 
Reference to self-determination and sovereignty of states dose 
not only relate to the very nature of law from a philosophical point of 
view as positivist, but also becomes a constitutional theory and is seen 
as being consistent with, and at the same time to protect, fundamental 
constitutional values of democracy, sovereignty and self­determination. 
This of course is easily translated into a political theory where as the 
protection of these values becomes a central issue, at equal footing with 
the protection of fundamental human rights.
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VI
Favouring one approach or the other clearly dictates the acceptance 
or, as the case may be, the non­acceptances of international law by the 
domestic courts, including judgments of international tribunals like the 
ECtHR. Thus on the one hand we have those who hold that reluctance 
to accepting international law without clear approval of the legislature 
is more consistent with the idea of democracy, the democratic process 
behind legislation and democratic accountability, as the responsibility of 
the legislature for a given norm is clearer. These considerations emerge 
on the purely political level as views which are more leaned to politics 
sceptical of globalisation as a threat to sovereignty and independence of 
the nation State. On the other hand we have those promoting progressive 
internationalism and openness to international norms as more consistent 
with effective protection of fundamental rights in line with common 
standards and natural law and natural rights of individuals.
VII
I submit that the reasons for the sometimes somewhat heated 
tensions between national courts and the ECtHR is at least partly a 
result of the clash between progressive internationalism as the best way 
to protect fundamental rights and the emphasis on sovereign states and 
the democratic process within states as the best forum for the same. 
The judges of the court are aware of these different approaches 
and seek to find a middle way. Of course they must be truthful to their 
mission to define a common standard for the protection of human rights 
in Europe and thus often rule against the national courts. At the same 
time accept, as that the national authorities and courts are, by reason of 
their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries 
are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local 
needs and conditions [9]. It is precisely for this reasons that the court 
has developed some key concepts that server to facilitate co­operation 
between the national Courts and the ECtHR and to alleviate tensions.
First one should mention, the principle of judicial restraint, 
under which the Court would sometimes avoid a progressive approach 
which aims at extending the protection under the provisions of the 
Convention beyond traditional or common understanding of the role of 
an international judicial body, and thus leave it rather to the contracting 
parties themselves, the states, to define the legal status within the 
framework of the democratic process in each individual country. Many 
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critics argue that the Court has not always succeeded in this regard and 
it has at time been far too progressive. However, the Court is conscious 
of the balance that must be struck in this regard.
Another concept is the margin of appreciation which relates to the 
discretion of the national authorities and the national courts. In the case 
law of the ECtHR at least three different versions of the concept can be 
identified. 
Firstly it relates to the means chosen by the states to effectively 
protect the rights under the Convention. It reflects the acknowledgement 
of the fact that states may use different means to achieve the same goal. 
Secondly, it relates to the balancing exercise between the protection 
of individual rights and collective goals. It is accepted that states have a 
certain margin to limit rights to achieve certain common goals or goods 
relating to the welfare of society as a whole.
Thirdly, the concept of margin of appreciation relates to the 
intensity of the scrutiny as to whether rights have been violated. It 
reflects a certain willingness to accept the domestic courts assessment 
thereof if it is based on the relevant criteria established by the court in 
its earlier case law. 
The margin of appreciation has been welcomed on the national 
level although many would advocate for a wider margin. However, not 
surprisingly, the pro­internationalists are not all happy. There are scholars 
who argue that under a certain understanding of the moral character of 
human rights and of the role of judicial review, the use of the concept of 
margin of appreciation cannot be morally justified [10]. 
And finally, one should mention the concept of subsidiary whereby 
under the Convention applicants are required to exhaust domestic 
remedies to give the domestic courts an opportunity to put things right 
before the applicant can bring his case to Strasbourg. This is not an 
invention by the Court, but directly provided for by the Convention.
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Summary
Björgvinsson David Thór. Reflections on the interplay between the 
domestic courts and the European court of human rights. – Article.
The article deals with the co­operation between the national Courts (including 
Constitutional Courts) and the European Court of Human Rights. Analyzed two 
ways of thinking: pro­international (pro­globalisation) and domestic with the 
emphasis on self­determination and sovereignty states. Discussed the correlation 
between international law and domestic law. 
Keywords: the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court 
of Human Rights, self­determination, sovereignty, case law.
Аннотация
Бйоргвинсон Дэвид Тор. Размышления о взаимодействии между 
национальными судами и Европейским судом по правам человека. – 
Статья.
В статье рассмотрены вопросы взаимодействия между национальными 
судами (включая конституционные суды) и Европейским судом по правам че­
ловека. проанализировано два образа мышления: про­международное (про­
глобализационое) и внутригосударственное с акцентом на самоопределение и 
суверенитет государств. Рассмотрены вопросы соотношения международно­
го права и внутригосударственного.
Ключевые слова: Европейская конвенция по правам человека, Европей­




Бйоргвінсон Девід Тор. Роздуми про взаємодію між національними 
судами і Європейським судом з прав людини. – Стаття.
У статті розглянуті питання взаємодії між національними судами (вклю­
чаючи конституційні суди) та Європейським судом з прав людини. проаналі­
зовано два образа мислення: про­міжнародне (про­глобалізаційне) і внутріш­
ньодержавне з акцентом на самовизначення та суверенітет держав. Розглянуті 
питання співвідношення міжнародного права і внутрішньодержавного.
Ключові слова: Європейська конвенція з прав людини, Європейський 
суд з прав людини, самовизначення, суверенітет, прецедентне право
